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I. Abstract/Executive Summary  
 The government of Australia has violated international human rights laws regarding to 
refugee and asylum seeker rights. Asylum seekers fleeing to Australia by boat, or by any 
“irregular maritime arrival,” are denied basic human rights outlined under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, both of which Australia has signed and ratified into its 
domestic legal code. The public perception of these colloquially deemed, “boatpeople,” changes 
depending on the political party in office. The transitional nature of this immigration issue allows 
for human rights abuses to go uncontested. This paper outlines the history of asylum seeker 
issues in Australia, the flip-flopping political stances regarding “boatpeople,” the direct 
violations of Australia’s international law obligations, the most heinous, current policy concerns 
under Tony Abbott’s administration, and possible sustainable solutions that can be applied with 
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II. Introduction  
On August 13, 2012, former Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, announced a 
major shift in the country’s refugee and asylum seeker policies. Rudd determined that any 
refugee or asylum seeker arriving by boat would no longer have the right to work.1 In addition, 
on July 19, 2013, Rudd proclaimed that any refugee or asylum seeker arriving by boat would no 
longer be resettled in Australia, even if refugee status were determined. A country hailed 
internationally on the forefront of respecting human rights, Australia currently faces a dilemma 
between maintaining its progressive, humanitarian reputation, or continuing to violate 
international law with its treatments of refugees.  Over the past year, the Australian government 
reintroduced offshore detention centers located on Christmas Island, Nauru, and Manus, Papua 
New Guinea, in order to process asylum seekers.3 An international, for-profit corporation, called 
Serco, manages these detention centers, along with eighteen other mainland facilities, in addition 
to several prisons around the country. The people kept in the Immigration Detention Centers are 
not criminals, however their living conditions would propose otherwise.  
Under the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, of which 
Australia is a signatory, a person seeking refugee status is not a criminal and he or she should be 
granted the same rights as citizens within the state.4 On August 22, 2013, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee in Geneva found that Australia had committed 143 violations under 
international law; the worst complaint ever made against the country. Citing forty-six cases of 
                                                        
1 Refugee Council of Australia, Enough is Enough: It’s Time For A New Approach. August 13, 2013, 1-6. 
2 Id. 
3 Visa, Immigration, and Refugees: By Boat, No visa, Dep’t of Immigration and Citizenship (Sept. 13, 2013) 
(Austl.). 
4 UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 31, 1951, U.N.T.S.  
5 Jan Govett, UN Claims Australia Has Violated International Law, THE COURIER (Sept. 12, 2013). 
  4 
“illegal detention,” the United Nations urged Australia to release these persons, and remedy its 
migration laws for refugee/asylum seekers.5 
The new Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, plans to handle the country’s refugee 
problem by “turning back the boats,” and increasing military action to forcibly return boats to 
their port of origin.6 Unfortunately, the new Australian Prime Minister does not appear to be 
changing any of the standing policies. This paper will argue that Australia has committed grave 
violations in international and human rights law by refusing “boat people” refugees the right to 
work and the right to family reunification, by unlawfully detaining individuals, by denying 
resettlement in Australia, and by forcibly returning asylum seekers to their countries of origin. 
Australia is a wealthy, democratic country with the resources available to properly process and 
rehabilitate refugees, especially since the number of refugees seeking asylum in Australia is 
comparatively low to other nations around the globe. In conclusion, this paper will suggest 
sustainable and constructive policy solutions, which adhere to international human rights 
standards, for the Australian government to implement in order to rectify refugee and asylum 










   
                                                        
6 Visa, Immigration and Refugees, supra note 3 
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III. Historical Background  
Historically, Australia has been highly praised for its efforts in refugee resettlement. 
Since World War II, Australia has resettled around 800,000 refugees.7 Australia was also one of 
the first countries to sign and ratify both the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol.8 Today, Australia continues to be ranked among the world’s top three resettlement 
countries, along with the United States and Canada.9 However, Australia’s policies towards 
asylum seekers are appalling. 
Over the past twenty years, Australian prime ministers have tried to grapple with the best 
policies to dealing with the increasing number of asylum seekers arriving in the country. During 
this period mandatory immigration detention and offshore processing have been key policies in 
attempts to reduce and deter the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat, or Irregular 
Maritime Arrivals (IMAs). Australia’s mandatory immigration detention system was introduced 
in 1992.10 In addition, amendments to the Australian Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in 1992 
prevented the access of detainees to judicial review.11 In 1994 the mandatory detention regime 
was expanded to apply to all non-citizens in Australia without a valid visa, not just boat 
arrivals.12 
While a significant increase in asylum seekers seeking protection in Australia exists, 
Australia’s share of asylum applications remains a very small fraction of the global total (about 
                                                        
7 Australian Human Rights Commission, Asylum seekers, refugees, and human rights: Snapshot Report, 4, 2013 
(Austl.). 
8 William Kirtley, The Tampa Incident: The Legality of Ruddock v. Vadarlis Under International Law and the 
Implications of Australia’s New Asylum Policy, 41 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 251, 257 (2002-2003). 
9 Australian Human Rights Commission, supra note 7 
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
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2.2%).13The current top five source countries for IMAs include Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iran, 
Pakistan, and Iraq.14 
 
  
IV. The Problem of “Boatpeople” in Contemporary Politics  
1. The Howard Government Sets the Stage 
 During the 1980s, Australia’s immigration policy went through a major shift toward 
accepting more migrants on humanitarian grounds.15 Refugees and asylum seekers received 
active support from citizens as more traveled to Australia’s shores. By 1996, and the election of 
Prime Minister John Howard, immigration policies became highly politicized with 71% of the 
population stating that too many migrants were coming into Australia.16 The Howard 
government made many restrictions to Australia’s immigration policies, but specifically 
regarding humanitarian migrants. Howard restricted their access to welfare, increased focus on 
skilled migrants, decreased family reunifications, and reduced the number of permanent visas 
given.17 In addition, the concept of “boatpeople” first gained media attention under the Howard 
government.18 Howard’s immigration policies towards “boatpeople,” the offensive colloquialism 
for IMAs, included the implementation of mandatory detention as stipulated under the Migration 
Amendment Act (Cth) of 1992, the post-Tampa policy of “turning the boats around,” and the 
processing of immigration claims outside of the Australian migration zone.19 
                                                        
13 Id. at 5 
14 Id. 
15 Katharine Betts, Immigration Policy Under the Howard Government, 38.2 Austrl. Jo. of Social Issues 169 (2003). 
16 Id. at 176 
17 Id. at 178 
18 Id at 183 
19 Id. at 185 
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 Australia received a massive influx in the number of IMAs in the late 1990s. From 1998 
to 1999 alone, the annual number of IMAs jumped from 200 to 3,740.20 The huge jump of 
incoming asylum seekers brought a lot of attention to how the country was assessing the claims 
of the IMAs. One aspect of the process that received scrutiny from the public, as well as some 
political factions, was that an Immigration Detention Center (IDC) also held illegal immigrants 
and non-citizens awaiting deportation, some due to criminal offenses.21 This meant women and 
children, along with any other IMA, were held in the same facilities as potential criminals. As 
the number of asylum seekers increased, so did the number of detention centers, which were 
placed in remote areas of the country.22 Both domestic and international human rights groups 
criticized Australia’s IDCs because of their alleged poor conditions drawn to attention by 
detainee hunger strikes, protests, riots, and breakouts from the centers.23 
 
2. The Tampa Incident and a New Solution 
 The Howard government’s strict immigration policies towards refugee and asylum 
seekers were tested in August 2001 with the Tampa incident. A Norwegian freighter, MV Tampa, 
rescued 433 mainly Afghani asylum seekers in the waters between Indonesia and North Australia 
when their fishing vessel began to sink.23 After intercepting the vessel, the MV Tampa crew tried 
to deliver the asylum seekers to Australia, but the Australian government stated that they would 
not be permitted entry into the country.24 Subsequently, the Howard government quickly pushed 
through multiple bills that would allow the Australian Navy to intercept any boats found to be 




23 Id. at 33 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
  8 
heading to Australia and transfer them back to the boat’s point of origin, or to an Australian 
migration zone where their asylum claims would be processed.25 As a result, the 433 persons 
rescued by the Tampa freighter were taken to Nauru or Papua New Guinea and placed in 
detention centers until the Australian government processed their statuses as refugees.26 This 
“Pacific Solution” allowed the Australia government to transfer unauthorized arrivals to these 
Offshore Processing Centers (OPCs) where the detainees were not provided with legal assistance 
or access to judicial review.27  Instead, immigration or UNHCR officials were in charge of 
processing the claims.  
The amendments made to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) following the Tampa affair 
legitimized the Australian government’s ability to require separate visa application for “onshore” 
and “offshore” arrivals, and to allow the transfer of “offshore entry persons,” or IMAs, “to third 
countries for processing and resettlement.”28 The “Pacific Solution” was meant to deter future 
asylum seekers coming by boat However, over those seven years, 1,637 people had been 
detained in these facilities, with only 61% of the 70% of people granted asylum resettled in 
Australia.29 The “Pacific Solution” was widely criticized by human rights and refugee groups as 
not upholding the standards of international refugee law, being overly expensive to operate, and 
having psychologically damaging effects to the detainees.30 On February 8, 2008, the “Pacific 
Solution” formally ended when Prime Minister Kevin Rudd called for the closing of the OPCs 
                                                        
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, Parliament of Australia, Dep’t of Parliamentary Services, Boats arrivals in 
Australia since 1976 (July 23, 2013) (Austl.). 
28 Peter Billings, Irregular Maritime Migration and the Pacific Solution Mark II: Back to the Future for Refugee 
Law and Policy in Australia?, 20 Int’l J. on Minority and Group Rights 279, 283 (2013). 
29 Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, supra note 27. 
30 Id. 
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on Manus, Papua New Guinea and Nauru, and the final 21 detainees were resettled in 
Australia.31 
 
3. Temporary Protection Visas and the Glimmer of Reform 
 Another aspect of the Howard government that had prolonged effects on the immigration 
policies of Australia was the creation of Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs). In 1999, the 
Australian government implemented TPVs for unauthorized asylum seekers that were valid for 
three-year terms, and then their status as refugees would be reassessed.32 TPV holders were 
given the right to work and access to medical care and welfare, but they had reduced access to 
settlement services, no right to family reunification through the government, and no travel 
rights.33 Approximately, 11,000 people were issued TPVs from 1999 to 2007, and almost 90% of 
those were eventually granted permanent residency.34  
When Kevin Rudd of the Labor Party took power in 2008, he abolished various aspects 
of “Pacific Solution,” and called for a more humane treatment of asylum seekers.35 In addition, 
The UNHCR praised the Australian government for terminating this controversial policy.36 Rudd 
abolished TPVs and most of the OPCs as part of the new government, but the detention center on 
Christmas Island, a remote island in the waters between Indonesia and Australia, remained open. 
Even though Australia’s immigration policies improved significantly on humanitarian terms, the 
public opinion still feared the fact that the number of IMAs continued to climb. Public pressure 
on government immigration reform escalated in December of 2010, when a boat sank off the 






36 UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes close of Australia’s Pacific Solution (Feb. 8, 2008). 
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coast of Christmas Island and up to fifty asylum seekers perished.37 This incident was the largest 
recorded loss of life in Australian waters in 115 years.38 By the time Rudd’s first term ended in 
2010, around 100 boats had been intercepted in Australian waters.39 The December 2010 tragedy 
combined with the continuance of IMAs seeking asylum led the Australian government to 
tighten its immigration policies once again. 
 
4. Gillard’s Solution 
When Julia Gillard took office in June of 2011, she revised the Labor party’s policies to 
focus more on deterring the IMAs.40 Gillard first proposed opening a regional detention center in 
East Timor, called the “Timor Solution,” but when the East Timorese government rejected the 
plan, Gillard eventually decided to reopen the OPCs on Manus, Papua New Guinea and Nauru, 
in addition to the one still in operation on Christmas Island.41 Gillard also implemented a “co-
operative bilateral transfer” agreement with the Malaysian government, which stated that both 
countries would work together to address the IMA issue and combat people smuggling.42 
Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but by participating in the “refugee 
swap,” the UNHCR was permitted to assist Malaysia with the IMA resettlement process to 
ensure that the government was adhering to international law standards.43 Gillard’s attempt to 
require OPCs produced political impasse that required reforms to IMA laws. 
The publication of the Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers on August 13, 2012, 
commonly known as the “Houston Report,” asserted that asylum seekers arriving by boat should                                                         
37 Billings, supra note 28 at 286. 
38 Id. 
39 Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, supra note 21. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Billings, supra note 37 at 287. 
43 Id. 
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not receive advantages over refugees waiting for resettlement that arrived by legal means.44 
From this report, the Gillard government drew justification for its policy shifts. The Australian 
Parliament swiftly passed the Migration Legislation Amendment Act, or Regional Processing Act 
(Cth), which led the way for the “Pacific Solution Mark II.”45 The Regional Processing Act only 
punished asylum seekers coming by boat. Even if a person arrived by air undocumented, their 
claims would be processed normally and they would be given “bridging visas” that allow them to 
work in the community.46 However, IMAs were no longer permitted to apply for valid visa 
applications.47 In addition, on August 13, 2012, the Gillard government imposed the “no 
advantage principle” on asylum seekers coming by boat through places like Christmas Island.48 
The “no advantage” principle stated that the government would continue to send people to 
offshore processing centers; it would prevent anyone found to be a refugee from attaining a 
permanent protection visa; and it would strip immigrants of their right to work.49 The “no 
advantage” principle adopted the “Houston Report” recommendation that all IMAs, despite 
landing on Australian territory or not, should not be allowed the same rights as “legally” arriving 
asylum seekers.50 The “no advantage” principle attempted to reward migration through regular 
humanitarian or refugee visa channels, and “disincentivise” irregular migration.51  
The reopening of offshore processing centers garnered more international criticism by 
human rights groups. Human Rights Watch alleged that the forcible transfer of irregular 
                                                        
44 Id. at 280 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Billings, supra note 42 at 280. 
48 Dep’t of Immigration and Border Protection, Australian Gov’t, Fact Sheet 65- Onshore Processing 
Arrangements: Bridging Visas for Irregular Maritime Arrivals (May 2013). 
49 Id. 
50 Billings, supra note 47 at 281. 
51 Id. at 293 
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maritime arrivals to Australia was in violation of refugee protection under international law.52 
The August 13th date was an unfair, arbitrary deadline that severely limited asylum seekers and 
refugees in their abilities to integrate into Australian society. Human Rights Watch also claimed 
that Gillard expected asylum seekers could be sent to Nauru as early as within a month, where 
they would have to sleep in tents, and their claims might not be processed for up to five years.53 
The Gillard government was not empathetic to IMAs seeking a better life, but rather more 
concerned with deterrence efforts to keep the “boatpeople” out. 
 
5. Rudd and Abbott: Politics over Policies 
Gillard’s methods of deterrence proved unsuccessful. Under the introduction of the “no 
advantage” principle on August 13, 2012, the date of the “Houston Report,” Gillard reintroduced 
mandatory regional offshore processing. The number of IMAs briefly fell between the 
September-December quarters (2,513-1,622 IMAs), and then increased by the March 2013 
quarter (7,464 IMAs).54 The influx of IMAs did not proportionally correspond to the number of 
granted protection visas, which dropped from 3,685 in the Sept. 2012 quarter to 1,778 by the 
March 2013 quarter, even though the majority of IMAs were still found to be refugees.55  
The reelection of Kevin Rudd on June 27, 2013 brought renewed hopes that refugee and 
asylum seeker legislation would be revised with a humanitarian focus since Rudd opposed most 
of Howard’s policies in his previous term. Those hopes were dashed quickly when, not four 
weeks into term, Rudd announced that all IMAs coming to Australia would be processed and 
                                                        
52 Australia: ‘Pacific Solution’ Redux: New Refugee Law Discriminatory, Arbitrary, Unfair, Inhumane, Human 
Rights Watch, Aug. 17, 2012. 
53 Human Rights Watch, Aug. 17, 2012, supra note 33. 
54 Dep’t of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Gov’t, Asylum Statistics-Australia: Quarterly Tables-March 
Quarter 2013 (March 2013). 
55 Id. 
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resettled in Papua New Guinea, one of the poorest countries in the Pacific.56 The Regional 
Settlement Arrangement (RSA) with the Papua New Guinea government also outlined that any 
IMA not found to be a “genuine refugee” would be returned to their country of origin.57 Rudd’s 
“PNG Solution” was not only an attempt to deter people coming by boat, but it was a political 
method to combat conservative opposition leader, Tony Abbott, who was gaining more 
popularity.58  
The upcoming elections for prime minister in September kept both Rudd and Abbott 
feuding to “out-conservative” the other by advocating strict border policies. Both Abbott and 
Rudd firmly believed that by restricting the rights of immigrants coming by boat, fewer people 
would try to come to Australia by that method, and therefore the number of asylum seeker deaths 
at sea would diminish. Over 1,000 people are believed to have drowned on the way to Australia 
due to unsafe boat vessels,59 with 805 confirmed deceased men, women, and children between 
2009-July 2013 alone.60 Rudd and Abbott campaigned behind the idea of preventing deaths at 
sea to justify severe immigration policies. Amidst campaigning, Rudd passed a New 
Memorandum of Understanding with Nauru that provides that the Nauruan government will 
resettle “legitimate” asylum seekers within its borders.61 (AHRC 5) The third country regional 
processing centers on Papua New Guinea and Nauru were firmly established. 
 Tony Abbott was elected Prime Minister on September 10, 2013, and one of his first 
policy moves was the implementation of “Operation Sovereign Borders.” Abbott’s policy 
priority to develop stronger borders and protect the sovereignty of Australia plans to: renew 
                                                        
56 Australia’s Boat People: The PNG Solution, The Economist, July 27, 2013. 
57 Australian Human Rights Commission, supra note 7 at 4 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Lenore Taylor, Kevin Rudd’s boat fix shows good sense has sailed, The Guardian, July 19, 2013. 
61 Australian Human Rights Commission, supra note 57 at 5 
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cooperation with Indonesia against people smugglers, reintroduce Temporary Protection Visas, 
use the Australian Navy to return boats from their point of origin (mainly Indonesia or Sri 
Lanka) when safe to do so, diminish priority of applications for IMAs, prevent IMAs from 
obtaining permanent residency in Australia, and establish presumption against refugee status for 
IMAs that have discarded identification papers.62 Furthermore, IMAs released into the 
community on bridging visas post-August 13, 2012 have no right to work and must rely on 
insufficient welfare support; thus creating arbitrary “two-tiers” of asylum seekers.63 
“Operation Sovereign Borders” has already received vast criticisms from domestic and 
international human rights groups claiming that Abbott is not only violating Indonesia’s 
sovereignty by forcing the country to receive the IMA boats, but the policy foists burdens onto 
Papua New Guinea and Nauru that have far less capacity to process claims and integrate refugees 
than Australia.64 On September 27, 2013, just weeks after Abbott’s policy went into effect, at 
least 31 asylum seekers died off the coast of Java en route to Australia.65 Even though Abbott 
maintains that he will not budge in his policies, it is evident that the threat of not attaining 
refugee status in Australia is not deterring IMAs. As long as the situation in their country of 
origin creates the necessity to flee, the IMAs will continue to come to Australia, because the 
smallest hope of a better life outweighs the probable consequence of persecution or death. 
 
V. Public Perception  
1. Political Pressure to Label “Legitimacy”                                                         
62 Tony Abbott, The Coalition Parliament of Australia, Our Plan: Real Solutions for all Australians: 20. Delivering 
stronger borders and a more secure nation 47-48 (Jan. 2013). 
63 Billings, supra note 50 at 305. 
64 Elaine Pearson, Dispatches: Australia- News Government, New Boats, Human Rights Watch, Sept. 10, 2013. 
65 Karishma Vaswami, Australian PM says ‘united’ with Indonesia on migrants, BBC News: Asia, Sept. 30, 2013. 
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 The Howard government’s “Pacific Solution” profoundly affected not only the political 
climate, but also the public opinion towards asylum seekers. Howard’s nationalism generated 
massive support among constituents who valued Australia’s “sovereign rights,” as an 
independent nation, to protect its borders.66 The Tampa crisis and the attacks on 9/11 further 
crystallized negative public sentiment regarding IMAs and the increased desire for border 
security.67 The people of Australia wanted to know who was coming to this country, when, and 
by what means.68 The Tampa incident in 2001 also put pressure on the government and media to 
define these asylum seekers coming by boat, resulting in labeling based on stereotypical and 
deceptive languages to convey particular sentiments.69 By implementing binary terms, such as 
legal v. illegal and refugees v. asylum seekers, the media automatically alienated and categorized 
one as a subgroup.  
 
2. Humanitarian Outlook 
 In 2007, the Labor Party adopted a more humanitarian outlook on policies regarding 
IMAs. The party removed mandatory immigration detention, promised to keep children out of 
IDCs, and shifted the focus of disdain to the problem of people smugglers.70 The public opinion 
of asylum seekers also shifted from wanting to deter IMAs based on protection of sovereign 
borders to “saving lives at sea.”71 The Labor party hoped that strengthening the nation’s anti-
smuggling laws would deter human smuggling and exploitation.72 On a positive note, Australia 
                                                        
66 Billings, supra note 63. 
67 Elizabeth Rowe and Erin O’Brien, Constructions of asylum seekers and refugees in Australian political discourse, 
2 Crime and Justice Research Center, QLD U. of Technology, 173, 176 (2013). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Billings, supra note 66 at 280. 
71 Id. at 304. 
72 Id. at 280. 
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increased its refugee intake from 13,750 to 20,000 per annum, as referenced by the UNHCR.73 
This marks a positive humanitarian shift toward the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. 
However, the Labor party eventually retreated from its humanitarian policies towards ones more 
similar to the “Pacific Solution” due to the sharp increase of boat arrivals.74 
 
3. “Boat People” Becomes a Trend 
 Under the Gillard government and her proposed “Malaysia Deal,” the term “boat people” 
first emerged in the media.75 “Boat people” is the derogatory definition of asylum seekers 
arriving by boat, legally defined as Irregular Maritime Arrivals (IMAs). Other terms used by the 
media during the discussion of the “Malaysia Deal” included: “illegal arrivals,” “genuine 
refugees,” and “queue jumpers.”76 These terms misled the public into believing that IMAs equate 
to illegal immigrants, despite the right to seek asylum from persecution that is guaranteed by the 
1951 Refugee Convention. Unfortunately, the term “boatpeople” is frequently used by Australian 
citizens, despite its negative stereotypes, due to the frequent use of the word my media moguls 
and politicians, including current Prime Minister Tony Abbott.  
 
4. Current Sensationalizing of Asylum Seekers 
Rudd and Abbott were highly successful at creating an anti-refugee sentiment directed 
towards boatpeople that permeated throughout Australia during their campaigns. Both sides used 
language including “national security,” “illegal,” and “border protection” when referring to 
                                                        
73 Id. at 281. 
74 Id. at 280 
75 Elizabeth Rowe and Erin O’Brien, supra note 67 at 175. 
76 Id. at 177. 
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IMAs, which incited a threatening feeling in the minds of Australians.77 Last year, about 90% of 
IMAs were found to be genuine refugees,78 but the political strategy of sensationalizing the need 
to “stop the boats” kept the majority of Australians believing that this was the best strategy. Both 
Abbott and Rudd also hinged on the humanitarian need to “stop people from drowning” as 
support for their policies.79 If boats were deterred by the “no advantage” principle, then logically 
fewer people would be at risk of death at sea. Rudd and Abbott employed the tactic of 
dichotomous characterization where asylum seekers are either “legitimate humanitarian 
refugees” or “illegitimate boat arrivals.”80 The “no advantage” principle also intensified public 
sentiment that IMAs are “queue jumpers,” takings the place of valid, “legal” refugee 
applicants.81 However, no “queue” of asylum seekers typically exists in processing centers 
overseas.82 Asylum seekers by land, air, or sea eventually end up in similar processing situations.  
The key flaw to the “no advantage” principle is the assumption that IMAs will comply 
with deterrence measures. Boats headed for Australia will most likely not settle in transit 
countries like Malaysia or Indonesia, nor will they be satisfied with waiting in the United 
Nations’ “endless queue” of resettlement applicants.83 Asylum seekers are already in a desperate 
situation if they are fleeing their home country in search for a better life. Australia is a bellwether 
country for quality of life compared to others in the Southeast-Asian region.84 Australia is the 
“land of opportunity” on social and economic levels.85 Even with the possibility of not having a 
                                                        
77 Lenore Taylor, supra note 41 
78 Id. 
79 Richard Bailey, Reviews, 24 Current Issues Crim. Just. 289, 294, (2012-2013). 
80 Elizabeth Rowe and Erin O’Brien, supra note 75 at 174. 
81 Billings, supra note 70 at 304. 
82 Id. 
83 Bailey, supra note 79 at 295. 
84 Interview with J.J. Messner, Senior Associate, Fund For Peace, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 18, 2013). 
85 Id. 
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right to work or not being settled in Australia, asylum seekers will still risk their lives for the 
chance to prosper.  
According to J.J. Messner at Fund For Peace, it is easier for politicians to create anti 
“boat people” sentiments because of their non-Western and “otherness.”86 Australia has a history 
of discriminating against “non-white” citizens, particularly regarding the White Australia Policy 
that lasted until the 1970s.87 The White Australia Policy limited the migration of non-Western 
European immigrants for over seventy years.88 The residue of racist immigration policies is 
evident in the deterrence measures taken to prevent IMAs since the majority of IMAs come from 
racially, culturally, and geographically “non-Western” backgrounds.89 Current Australian 
immigration policies reflect the historical techniques of “exceptional governance” which are 
characterized by partial suspension of laws to specific subjects. Groups affected by “exceptional 
governance” have included indigenous aboriginals, indentured servants from Pacific Islands, 
migrant workers, prisoners of war, and now asylum seekers.90 Ironically, today’s “Western” 
Australians are the descendents of European Irregular Maritime Arrivals that came to a country 
already inhabited by the native Aboriginals. If the “no advantage” policy had existed circa 18th-
19th century Australia, Western Europeans would be subjected to the same mandatory detention 
practices. Messner also highlighted the fact that “visa overstayers” from predominately European 
countries are a bigger problem for the Australian economy.91 Politicians have relied on the 
pervading “Us v. Them” mentality in Australian society to gather support for their restrictive 
immigration policies. 
                                                        
86 Id. 
87 Elizabeth Rowe and Erin O’Brien, supra note 80. 
88 Id. 
89 Messner, supra note 84. 
90 Billings, supra note 81 at 282. 
91 Messner, supra note 89. 
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VI. International Legal Obligations 
1. The 1951 Refugee Convention 
Australia is legally bound, from its ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, to protect the rights of asylum seekers and 
refugees within its territory.92 In addition, the 1951 Convention and its Protocol have been 
incorporated into Australian national legislation via the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the 
Migration Regulations 1994.93 Therefore, if Australia violates the Refugee Convention, the 
country is not only failing to adhere to international law but also to the standards set forth in its 
own constitution. However, the 1951 Convention does not address the procedures for 
determining refugee status, leaving state parties to choose the means of implementation.94  
According to the Convention, a refugee is a person who fears persecution for reasons of 
“race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,” and 
seeks habitual residence outside of the persecuting country.95 In Australia, refugees are entitled 
access to health care, social security, English class, housing services, subsidized 
accommodations, free primary and secondary schooling, in addition to employment assistance.96 
However, the Australian government’s binary treatment of asylum seekers, based solely upon 
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their mode of arrival, violates aspects of the Refugee Convention. Penalizing asylum seekers that 
enter “illegally” violates Article 31 of the convention97 
 
2. Non-refoulement 
The Australian government has argued that since most of the asylum seekers come by 
boat via Indonesia, Indonesia should be responsible for granting legitimate asylum status to the 
IMAs.98 Indonesian authorities do allow asylum seekers to remain within its borders while the 
UNHCR processes their claims, however, Indonesia is neither a signatory to the 1951 
Convention nor its 1967 Protocol, so its national law does not guarantee the rights permitted 
through attaining refugee status.99 If Australia returned IMAs back to Indonesia, it would not be 
violating the customary law of non-refoulement, even though the country is not bound by 
international laws, since the arrival would not be tantamount to returning the asylum seekers to a 
place of persecution.100 The principle of non-refoulement is fundamental to refugee law. In 
Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, it states that no refugee shall be returned to any 
country “where he or she is likely to face persecution or torture.”101 The principle, now 
considered by most states to be a rule of customary international law, applies to both refugees 
and asylum seekers.102 Therefore, Abbott’s policy of “turning the boats around,” which he 
proposed in his campaign, would violate the principle of non-refoulement by returning IMA 
vessels to either their point of origin or host country.103 Forced resettlement of refugees on Nauru 
and Manus, Papua New Guinea, could be argued as a violation of non-refoulement since the                                                         
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countries’ governments and economies have limited capacity to provide adequate resources to 
IMAs in detention and can barely sustain their own population with the resources available.104 
Nauru is also not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, making the forced 
relocation of IMAs to its shores highly controversial, even with Australia obliging to fund the 
offshore processing centers.105 
 
3. Law of the Sea 
Another argument providing evidence to Australia’s obligation to accept asylum seekers 
arriving by sea refers to the customary international laws of the sea. The UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, ratified by Australia in 1994, states that each nation’s sovereign territorial waters 
extends up to 12 nautical miles, or 22 km, beyond its coasts.106 As a historically accepted 
principle under international law, every state has the responsibility to protect the basic human 
rights of all persons within its territory, including maritime asylum seekers. By rejecting the 
entrance of IMAs on Australian soil, the country is in violation of customary law. Furthermore, 
the definition of Australia’s “migration zone” under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), that was not 
formally decided until after the Tampa incident, purposefully restricts the country’s territorial 
obligations to accept IMAs to the mean low water mark, or shoreline.107 Therefore, any IMAs 
intercepted before Australia’s shores, even if they are in its territorial water, are not legally 
granted rights to asylum. The Australian government has also passed legalization that exempts 
Christmas Island and other northern Australian islands from its “migration zone,” so IMAs do 
not have the right to apply for protection visas. Australia’s national laws have effectively 
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circumvented norms of international law to corroborate the country’s self-interested policies of 
IMA deterrence.  
 
4. Human Rights Law 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that every individual has the 
right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution.108 Australia does have the right to determine 
asylum status under its national laws and rights as a sovereign nation, but the caveat of required 
IMA offshore processing centers (OPCs), and denial of IMA refugee settlement, breaches 
international human rights laws. Australia’s policy of “mandatory detention” for all IMAs defies 
Article 9(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which 
Australia is a party, in that, “[a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall 
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide without delay” 
the legality of his detention.109 In addition, Article 9(1) of the ICCPR and Article 37(b) of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) mandate that no one should be subjected to 
arbitrary detention.110 The UN Human Rights Committee has repeatedly found Australia to be in 
breach of Article 9(1) of the ICCPR. The UNHCR and other human rights groups have criticized 
Australia’s mandatory detention of asylum seekers, in both offshore and onshore immigration 
detention centers (IDCs), for the past decade.  
 
 
VII. Current Issues in Australian Immigration Law  
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1. Mandatory Detention 
There are currently 24 Immigration Detention Centers (IDCs) spread across mainland 
Australia, including four on Christmas Island.111 Detainees are held under close watch in “closed 
detention” in the centers without freedom of movement.112 Under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), 
a non-citizen without a valid visa must be detained until they are granted a visa or removed from 
Australia.113 The enforcement of mandatory detention was introduced in 1992 as a temporary 
measure in response to an increasing number of Indo-Chinese asylum seekers arriving by boat, 
however, it still remains a core element to Australia’s immigration policies.114 Of the 9,375 
people in immigration detention as of September 5, 2013, 6,579 (or 70%) of these people were 
held in IDCs, and the remaining 2,796 were in community detention.115 Australia’s arbitrary 
system of mandatory detention of IMAs deemed “unlawful non-citizens” prohibits detainees 
from access to judicial review and, under the Migration Act amendments, there is no time limit to 
how long a person can be detained.116 Therefore, any asylum seeker that arrives by boat can, 
according to current Australian immigration law, be held indefinitely and without explanation. 
Indefinite, prolonged detention can have detrimental effects on the detainees’ mental health. In 
the past year, there were 846 reported incidents of self-harm across Australia’s immigration 
detention network.117  
The New Directions policy announced in 2008 began the use of community detention for 
IMAs, which was seen by many critics as an improvement in detention policies. Since mid-2010, 
the Australian Government has made significant progress in moving asylum seekers into                                                         
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community-based arrangements to await assessment.118 As of September 2013, 2,796 individuals 
live in community detention.119 Even though community detention gives asylum seekers access 
to Australian services and the freedom of movement, IMAs arriving after August 13, 2012 are 
kept on bridging visas that deny them the right to work.120 As of September 2, 2013, over 21,000 
asylum seekers are living on bridging visas in Australia.121 The bridging visas, despite allowing 
the asylum seekers to live in community detention, prohibit the right to work and force many 
individuals and families into poverty.122 Denying IMAs the right to work specifically violates 
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights (ICESCR), 
which ensures “the right of access to employment, especially for disadvantaged and marginalized 
individuals and groups.”123 Asylum seekers automatically fit the criteria of disadvantaged and 
marginalized individuals. The denial of the right to work is one of the most obvious abuses of 
international law that Australia has committed.  
 
2. Third Country Processing 
International law does not prohibit third country processing of asylum seeker claims, but 
Australia’s new policies of mandatory third country processing for any IMA violate its 
responsibilities under the 1951 Refugee Convention.124 Requiring third country processing 
allows Australia to avoid its duties as a party to the Refugee Convention to accept refugee claims 
when they are presented.125 As of September 23, 2013 there were 710 asylum seekers detained 
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on Nauru and 798 on Manus, Papua New Guinea.126 The number of detainees in third country 
processing centers continues to increase, with 1,300 detainees being held on Manus Island as of 
February 2014.126.2 The longer asylum seekers continue to be held in mandatory, offshore 
processing centers,  the more tensions between detainees and camp security will increase, as well 
as tension between Australia and the rest of the international community. 
 
 
VIII. Pressures to Reform  
1. Domestic Pressure 
 An issue surrounding an aspect of mandatory detention for asylum seekers is the 
prohibition of a detainee’s access to judicial review. In the M61 case, two Sri Lankan detainees 
claimed that they had been denied “natural justice,” because they were barred from applying for 
protection visas, and they did not consider themselves bound to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). 
The M61 decision extended Australian judicial review to IMAs processed at OPCs by 
reinforcing the norms of international human rights law that prohibits arbitrary detention.127 
Therefore, current detainees that have been denied the right of due process could bring a case to 
the High Court of Australia (HCA). The HCA has the legal jurisdiction resolved under the M61 
case to prosecute detention law violations.  
However, the Australian government could argue that detention cases cannot be brought 
against the country since its current policies mandate that detainees must adhere to the laws and                                                         
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procedures of the processing countries.128 This practice would thereby eliminate Australia’s 
responsibility to protect detention violations. However, Australia is still bound to its international 
obligations to protect asylum seeker and refugee rights under the 1951 Refugee Convention, and 
the M61 case could permit the HCA review powers of Australian officials, and private 
contractors employed by the Australian government, in foreign countries.129 Therefore, Australia 
has both responsibilities under international and domestic law to investigate and prosecute 
violations against the detainees held in offshore processing centers. 
 
2. Domestic Human Rights Groups 
 In response to the Australian government’s maltreatment of asylum seekers, human rights 
groups across the country have voiced their outrage. Since the enactment of John Howard’s 
“Pacific Solution,” the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) has spoken out against 
the government’s international human rights violations. Most recently, the AHRC released a 
report in October 2013 regarding the significant gap between the country’s treatment of asylum 
seekers and refugees, and its obligations under international law.130 The AHRC report details its 
observations of mandatory immigration detention and third country processing of IMAs on 
Nauru and Manus, Papua New Guinea.131 The AHRC also found that arbitrary mandatory 
detention inflicted “serious psychological harm” upon the detainees, thereby amounting to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.132 
The Refugee Council of Australia (RCOA) is another domestic human rights 
organization that tirelessly works to change the discriminating policies, to help members of the                                                         
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refugee/asylum seeker community in Australia, and to educate communities on the 
refugee/asylum seeker rights violations. The RCOA is made up of 180 different organizations 
and 700 members across Australia.132.1 In November 2013, Paul Power, CEO of RCOA, 
addressed the Southern Migrant and Refugee Center at their Annual General Meeting discussing 
the current policy concerns instated by Tony Abbott’s Coalition Government.132.2 Power 
emphasized several major problems domestic human rights groups should be advocating against.
 Firstly, Australia is cutting the Refugee and Humanitarian Program by 6,250 permanent 
places for refugees each year.132.3 Secondly, the IMAs sent to Papua New Guinea and Nauru will 
experience “indefinite detention,” without any information regarding long-term protection, on 
the basis of their mode of arrival by boat.132.4 Thirdly, Australia’s “enhanced screening” process 
has led to over 1,000 asylum seekers forcibly returned to their country of origin where many will 
face persecution.132.5 Fourthly, the Australian government is in cohorts with Sri Lanka, a country 
with an abhorrent human rights record and one that has been a major source of refugees, to 
prevent people from fleeing Sri Lanka.132.6 Fifthly, not only are many IMAs living in Australia 
without the right to work if they arrived after August 13, 2012, IMAs do not have funded legal 
advice and face the potential of no longer having access to independent case review by the 
Refugee Review Tribunal.132.7 IMAs found to be genuine refugees are also denied permanent 
protection status and reunification rights with separated family members.132.8 Finally, there are 
50 refugees permanently detained in Melbourne and Sydney IDCs because of adverse security 
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assessments, which they are not allowed to contest because of their IMA status.132.9 All of these 
concerns present enormous policy hurdles the human rights community must overcome, 
however, instead of dwelling in pessimism, activists must remain optimistic and work tirelessly 
to find sustainable, constructive solutions.  
 
3. International Pressure 
 Australia’s current treatment of asylum seekers has garnered widespread criticism from 
the international community. When the country reintroduced offshore processing of IMAs, the 
UNHCR voiced its concerns and refusals to assist in administering the process of resettlement.133 
According to the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, Australia’s mandatory detention and 
offshore processing of IMAs breaches its international obligations to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and contradicts its responsibility to adhere to the “good faith” of treaty 
ratification.134 Additionally, in December of 2012, the UNHCR Mission to the Republic of 
Nauru reported that the reception conditions on Nauru and Manus, Papua New Guinea violate 
international standards.135 Even though the “Houston Report” has been criticized from requiring 
mandatory OPCs, the report did necessitate appropriate treatment and accommodation of the 
IMAs.136 However, the UNHCR found the living conditions on Manus and Nauru to be “cruel, 
inhumane, and degrading”.137 If Australia refuses to improve the living conditions at the OPCs 
and refuses to remove mandatory offshore processing, it will be subject to inspection for 
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breaking international treaty and human rights laws. According to a representative from UNHCR 
in Geneva, the conservative governments in Australia have played a major role in the increase of 
asylum seeker rights abuses in the country.137.1 UNHCR’s power to affect change is limited to 
publishing policy recommendations because of the political nature of the United Nations. 
Therefore, UNHCR must find the “balance between human rights and diplomacy,” when it 
comes to putting pressure on nation’s to repair asylum seeker and refugee laws.137.2 
 Controversy also surrounds Australia’s failure to process visa applications in a timely, 
organized fashion. One example concerns an Iraqi refugee, Mohammed Sagar, who was 
transferred to Nauru in 2002 for processing.138 Australia denied Sagar entry in 2005, and he 
remained there until Sweden stepped in to resettle him.139 Sagar sought access to the reasons 
why Australia refused to process his status, but the Federal Court of Australia refused.140 
Denying Sagar’s right to natural justice blatantly violates his human rights. As of August 31, 
2013, 6,136 people (75%) had been detained for 3 months or less; 1,881 people (23%) had been 
detained between 3 and 12 months; and 189 people (2%) had been detained for over a year, with 
some still detained after 4 years.141 Keeping an asylum seeker detained for more than a year, 
especially since the detainees have no knowledge of when their detainment will cease, has 
enormously detrimental mental effects. The UN Human Rights Committee found that Australia 
had violated “the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
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punishment,” and “the right of people detained to be treated with dignity” by keeping people 
detained for long periods of time with full knowledge of the adverse mental effects.142  
 
IX.  Recommendations  
The Australian government needs to adjust its policies regarding mandatory immigration 
detention so that the policies adhere to international law. Cases of detention should be considered 
on an individual basis if deemed necessary to his or her case.143 The current method of detaining 
all asylum seekers that arrive by boat generalizes the entire group and prolongs the refugee 
assessment process. Furthermore, the Australian Migration Act 1958 (Cth) must be amended to 
enforce a time limit for detention and access to judicial oversight.144 The Australian government 
needs to grant legal permission to IMAs so they are allowed to remain in Australia while their 
refugee status is determined, and, furthermore, to be allowed to live in Australia if they are found 
to be refugees. Currently, domestic policy has excised Australia’s mainland and outlying 
territories, including Christmas Island, from the boundaries allowed to accept IMAs.144.1 By 
implementing these changes, Australia will be upholding its obligations to international human 
rights law.  
Additionally, Australia should continue to transfer IMAs into community detention. 
Community detention aligns more closely with Australia’s international human rights obligations 
that detention in onshore or offshore processing centers do.1145 Developing alternatives to IDCs, 
such as community detention or bridging visas, is critical to building a sense of safety and                                                         
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security for recent immigrants.145.1 Bridging visas also mark a positive step away from 
mandatory detention, but in order for the visas to be successful, Australian IMAs arriving after 
August 13, 2012 must be reinstated with the right to work. The majority of refugees living in the 
Asia-Pacific region live in cities and towns rather than camps making it necessary for them to 
have the right to work.145.2 Refugees in cities like Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok fill major gaps in 
the labor market and significantly contribute to their host country’s economy, but because they 
are not allowed to work, they are liable to arrest at any time.145.3 The IMAs who arrived in 
Australia after August 13, 2012 and were resettled in community detention centers are not given 
the right to work either. The only help this group of asylum seekers receives comes from NGOs 
who help with emergency assistance, health care, education, and legal representation all without 
government support.145.4  
If Australia is not currently willing to resettle IMAs, there are other alternatives to in-
country resettlement. Three traditional durable solutions are: assisted voluntary repatriation to 
the country of origin if it does not interfere with non-refoulement, integration in the country 
where the refugee has been given asylum, or resettlement to a third country.145.5 At the moment 
Australia has chosen to resettle all IMAs to third country, OPCs on Nauru and Papua New 
Guinea. A substitute to these options would allow some refugees to remain or to go to another 
country under migrant worker arrangements.145.6 Since Australia is a resettlement country for 
asylum seekers/refugees arriving by all other means except by boat, it should remove its excision 
policy and not discriminate against a singular type of asylum seeker. Australia is a successful and 
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powerful state whose role in the international community could considerably affect neighboring 
countries’ refugee/asylum seeker policies. As a member of the United Nations and having 
ratified the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, Australia is formally bound to cooperate with 
UNHCR in facilitating “its duty of supervising the applications of the provisions” in the 
Convention and its Protocol.146 Australia must adhere to its international law obligations by 
taking away mandatory detention, eliminating all offshore and third country processing centers, 
and reinstating the right to work. 
 
 
X. Conclusion  
 The Australian government’s blatant violation of the rights of asylum seekers and 
refugees is a major concern for its reputation in the international community. If Australia 
continues to forcibly resettle irregular maritime arrivals outside of its borders, the United Nations 
will have to address Australia’s breach of the UN convention regarding the rights of refugees, 
and take action to prevent further human rights abuses from occurring. Preventing refugees that 
come by boat from becoming Australian citizens, and forcing them to live like criminals in 
detention centers in countries that lack the resources to properly accommodate their needs, is a 
blatant violation of Australia’s commitment to international law. Arguably, Tony Abbott’s 
current immigration policies restrict and violate more rights of asylum seekers than those 
administered by the Howard government. These strict policies, however, are not having the 
expected outcome of “stopping the boats” since the number of IMAs has not declined. Australia 
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has long been viewed as a modern, democratic country that has worked diligently to respect the 
human rights of its citizens. However, the direction the country is currently taking is exactly 
opposite of their reputation in regards to the rights of asylum seekers and refugees. At this 
crossroads in foreign policy, the Abbott government must choose the path of being a bellwether 
country for its region by treating all asylum seekers, regardless of mode of arrival, as equal 
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